The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) became operational on 1 October 1961 as the Nation's primary producer of foreign military intelligence. It filled a critically important need for a central intelligence manager for the Department of Defense (DoD) to support the requirements of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the military forces, as well as other policymakers.

During the period following World War II until the Agency's establishment, the three Military Departments separately collected, produced, and disseminated intelligence for their individual use. The system proved duplicative, costly, and ineffective as each Service provided their estimates to the Secretary of Defense, the Unified and Specified (U&S) Commands, or other governmental agencies.

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 sought to correct these shortcomings by assigning responsibility for U&S Command intelligence support to the J-2 of the JCS. However, DoD intelligence responsibilities remained unclear, coordination poor, and products lacked dependability and national focus. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, therefore, appointed the Joint Study Group in 1960 to determine better ways of effectively organizing the nation's military intelligence activities.

Acting on the recommendations of the Joint Study Group, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara in February 1961 advised the JCS of his decision to establish a Defense Intelligence Agency and tasked them with developing a concept plan that would extensively integrate the military intelligence efforts of all DoD elements. The JCS completed this assignment by July, and published DoD Directive 5105.21, "Defense Intelligence Agency" on 1 August, effective 1 October 1961.

According to the plan for the new Agency, DIA reported to the Secretary of Defense through the JCS. It was a union--not a confederation of Defense intelligence and counterintelligence activities, and it did not add administrative layering within the Defense intelligence community. The Agency's mission was the continuous task of collecting, processing, evaluating, analyzing, integrating, producing, and disseminating military intelligence for the DoD. Other objectives included more efficiently allocating scarce intelligence resources, more effectively managing all DoD intelligence activities, and eliminating redundancies in facilities, organizations, and tasks.

During the summer of 1961, as Cold War tensions flared over the Berlin Wall, Air Force Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll, soon to become DIA's first director, planned and organized this new agency. It began operations with a handful of employees in borrowed office space on 1 October 1961.

Following DIA's establishment, the Services transferred intelligence functions and resources to it on a time-phased basis to avoid rapidly degrading the overall effectiveness of defense intelligence. Specifically, DoD assigned DIA the mission of collecting, processing, evaluating, analyzing, integrating, producing, and disseminating military intelligence for the Department.

A year after its formation, the Agency faced its first major intelligence test during the superpower confrontation that developed after Soviet missiles were discovered at bases in Cuba. Yet, even in the midst of this crisis, Agency organizational efforts continued. In late 1962, DIA established the Defense Intelligence School, and on 1 January 1963, it activated a new Production Center. Several Service elements were merged to form this production facility, which occupied the "A" and "B" Building at Arlington Hall Station, Virginia.

The Agency also added an Automated Data Processing (ADP) Center on 19 February, a Dissemination Center on 31 March, and a Scientific and Technical Intelligence Directorate on 30 April 1963. DIA assumed the staff support functions of the J-2, Joint Staff, on 1 July 1963. Two years later, on 1 July 1965, DIA accepted responsibility for the Defense Attache System--the last function the Services transferred to DIA.

During these early years of DIA's existence, Agency attempts to establish itself as DoD's central military intelligence organization met with continuing Service opposition. At the same time, the Vietnam War severely tested the fledgling Agency's ability to produce accurate, timely intelligence. In particular, the war increased defense intelligence's involvement in efforts to account for American service members missing or captured in Southeast Asia.

DIA analysts focused during the 1960's on: China's detonation of an atomic bomb and the launching of its cultural revolution; increasing unrest among African nations; and, fighting in Malaysia, Cyprus, and Kashmir. In the late 1960's, crises that tested intelligence responsiveness included: the Tet offensive in Vietnam; the Six-Day War between Egypt and Israel; continuing troubles in Africa, particularly Nigeria; North Korea's seizure of the PUEBLO; and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

The early 1970's were transitional years for DIA as the Agency shifted its focus from consolidating internal and external management roles to establishing itself as a credible producer of national intelligence. This proved difficult at first since sweeping manpower decrements between 1968 and 1975 had reduced Agency manpower by 31 percent and precipitated mission reductions and a broad organizational restructuring. The attache system also underwent major revisions.

Challenges facing DIA at this time included: the rise of Ostpolitik in Germany; the emergence of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the Mideast; and, growing arms control concerns. Riots in Gdansk, Poland, civil wars in Jordan and Nigeria, and the U.S. incursion into Cambodia from South Vietnam also drew intelligence interest. Other crises during this period included: Idi Amin's takeover in Uganda; unrest in Pakistan; the formation of Bangladesh; and, continued fighting in Southeast Asia.

On 3 November 1970, DoD created a position for an Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) (ASD/I) "to supervise Defense intelligence programs . . . and to provide the principal point for management and policy coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence, the CIA, and other intelligence officials outside the DoD." Also in November, President Nixon reorganized the national Intelligence Community and designated DIA's Director as program manager for the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP). Of significance, the Agency established a Directorate for Estimates in November 1970.

The Agency's reputation grew considerably by the mid-1970's as its products were increasingly perceived throughout the government as valuable to decisionmaking. Meanwhile, the specially-convened Williamsburg Conference in 1972 looked closely at the effects of DIA resource reductions. Among the recommendations of conference participants were to place increased emphasis on technology in the Agency and to upgrade the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC). The General Counsel function was added that year, as well.

Agency analysts in 1972 concentrated on Lebanon, President Nixon's visit to China, the formation of Sri Lanka, Salvador Allende's regime in Chile, and the prisoners of war (POW's) being held in Southeast Asia. Subsequent challenges involved: detente; the development of arms control agreements; the Paris peace talks (Vietnam); the Yom Kippur War; global energy concerns; coups in Ethiopia and Portugal; and, independence movements in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau.

In 1974, DIA established a J-2 Support Office to better satisfy JCS's intelligence needs; and, in October of that year, began a comprehensive overhaul of its production functions, organization, and management. Positions for Defense Intelligence Officers (DIO's) were established in December. The DIO's were given the responsibility of acting as the DIA Director's senior staff representatives on substantive intelligence matters.

Intense Congressional review during 1975-76 created turbulence in the national Intelligence Community. The Murphy and Rockefeller Commission investigations of charges of intelligence abuse ultimately led to an Executive Order that modified many of the functions the Community performed. Within DIA, the leadership adopted the "delegated production" concept to offset heavy production requirements, and a report from the Intelligence Management Study Group led to a reorganization of all DIA production activities.

By 1975--with American involvement in Vietnam ending-defense intelligence faced massive resource decrements. During this period, DIA conducted numerous studies on ways of improving its intelligence products. Ultimately, the Agency strengthened its support to consumers in OSD, the JCS, and the Unified & Specified Commands, and also modernized the National Military Intelligence Center. Faced with similar resource challenges, DoD also sought to centralize its activities. The ASD/I was designated Director of Defense Intelligence, a Defense Intelligence Board was established, and the President set up a National Foreign Intelligence Board.

In 1977, a charter revision further clarified DIA's relationship with the JCS and the Secretary of Defense. Specifically, the Secretary assigned staff supervisory responsibility over DIA in the resource area to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, while giving the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs supervisory responsibility regarding policy matters. For a period during 1976 and 1977, DIA discontinued the positions of Deputy Director and Chief of Staff. Analytical efforts within the Agency at the time centered on the death of Mao Tse-Tung, aircraft hijacking, the Israeli raid on Entebbe Airport, unrest in South Africa, and continuing Middle East tension.

Following the promulgation in 1979 of Executive Order 12036, which restructured the Intelligence Community and better outlined DIA's national and departmental responsibilities, the Agency was reorganized around five major directorates: production, operations, resources, external affairs, and J-2 support. Despite these and other Community-wide efforts to improve intelligence support, the loss of resources during the 1970's limited the Community's ability to collect and produce timely intelligence and ultimately contributed to intelligence shortcomings in Iran, Afghanistan, and other strategic areas.

In fact, intelligence requirements were expanding while resources were decreasing. By the late 1970's Agency analysts were extremely busy focusing on Lebanon, China, South Africa, terrorism, and Southeast Asian POW issues. Special DIA task forces were set up to monitor crises such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the overthrow of Iranian monarchy, and the taking of U.S. hostages in the American embassy in Teheran in 1979. Also, of serious concern were the Vietnamese takeover in Phnom Penh, the China-Vietnam border war, the overthrow of Amin in Uganda, the North-South Yemen dispute, troubles in Pakistan, border clashes between Libya and Egypt, the Sandinista takeover in Nicaragua, and the Soviet movement of combat troops to Cuba during the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty II.




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