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JULY 2-6 EVENTS LEADING UP TO HILL 1000

July 2

SSG Paul Burkey was in charge of 3rd Platoon, C/2-506—on Ripcord for a mini-stand down when the devastating night attack on Hill 902 occurred—and he was itching to get back into action. All through the long night he had directly observed the flashes of explosions and heard their distant sound from the rocky fire base, had seen the green and red tracers crisscrossing in the night, and had listened to excited pleas for fire support over the radio. Burkey was not the kind of man who could just stand by and do nothing, yet here he was forced into that dismal state of affairs.

1st Lt. Jim Campbell, Burkey's platoon leader, had left for R&R from Hill 902 just the day before. It was ironic, since Campbell was one of the most squared away lieutenants in the battalion, and had he been there things might have gone differently. Maybe.

Capt. Jeff Wilcox, commanding Echo Company from the battalion rear base at Camp Evans was put in command of Charlie Company. The decision was made to pull the unit off Hill 902 and insert them 10 kilometers north, near Fire Base O'Reilly. Thus was Hill 902 ceded to the enemy.

There were two other important promontories that had direct observation of Ripcord, Hill 1000 directly west 1,000 meters and Hill 805, to the southeast about two kilometers. Hill 805 had been and continued to be the object of numerous GI patrols and occasional overnight occupations. Hill 1000 had been generally ignored, perhaps because it was so close and activity had not been detected there. Perhaps, also, because the 105mm howitzers on Ripcord could direct fire against Hill 1000. Who or what could withstand such potential devastation?

It was still not clear to the Americans that a siege had begun. A stand off attack by fire that, in retrospect, was eerily like the opening moves of the Viet Minh at the siege of Dien Bien Phu in 1953-54. Others would later remark that the opening days of Ripcord also recalled the beginning of the siege at Khe Sanh in 1968. We weren't so much ignorant of history or its lessons as we were bullheaded enough to believe that we could do it better. In the days ahead, we'd find out how right or wrong we were.

The enemy's stand off attack continued. GIs went about their work, fighting back and continuing to improve fire base defenses. Many expecting the enemy to attempt a ground attack in the days or nights ahead. But the disciplined North Vietnamese regulars kept their distance, sticking to their plan.

July 6

Now, Lucas began to focus his attention on Hill 1000. Much of the mortar firing had come from that direction, and he became determined to root out the enemy with ground forces.

At this point Capt. Gabe Rollison's Delta Co. secured the fire base, Capt. Chuck Hawkins' Alpha Co. was nine kilometers north, holding fast to O'Reilly, and Bravo Co., commanded by Capt. Bill Williams was patrolling the area around and on Hill 805. The battalion scouts were working in six- and seven-man teams in the AO.

Mid-afternoon on July 6 SSG Robert (Junior) Granberry's Recon Team Bravo was laboring up the northeast side of Hill 1000. Above them and over their left shoulders they could see Ripcord, and above them to their front they began to hear noises—sounds of enemy mortar crews.

Armed lightly with M-16s, Granberry reported the enemy activity, expecting that battalion would place a call for fire and he would adjust. Instead, someone—and it is not known for certain who this person was, but it was clearly someone in the battalion TOC—ordered Granberry to take his team and assault the enemy position. Incredible!

Granberry argued his case—anyone listening on the battalion net could have heard the exchange—but the order stood firm: Assault the enemy position on Hill 1000.

Like the good soldier he was, Granberry decided to follow orders. He didn't like it much, and he told his men he didn't. "Maybe," he whispered, "we can pull this off if we're careful."

Quietly they slithered forward, up the hill through the thick underbrush. The chatter of Vietnamese voices grew louder. The clinking of mortar base plates and ammunition became audible. But, for Recon Team Bravo, there was no going back, not now at any rate. With great stealth they drew closer and closer to the sounds of the enemy mortar crews.

As the team broached a bomb crater Granberry called a halt. They listened quietly in the afternoon heat. There were at least three mortar crews working above them, and not one as they originally thought. This meant as many as a dozen to 15 enemy soldiers. Granberry realized that the only thing he had going for him was surprise, and that advantage could vanish as quickly as someone made a misstep or other mistake. Putting his men in a rough on-line assault formation, the team began to move forward, uphill over the last few meters of ground before the enemy position.

"I don't know what it was," Granberry said later, "but someone snapped a twig or brushed a branch that snapped back, and that was all it took."

The startled enemy scrambled for cover and their weapons. Enemy infantry securing the mortar crews fired RPGs toward the attacking recon team. But they fired high, perhaps in haste or perhaps because they didn't know where the GIs were and wanted to hit them with tree bursts. Recon Team Bravo began returning fire, their only thought now was to cover a hasty withdrawal.

That Granberry and his men succeeded in extracting themselves from this situation is testimony enough to their skill and courage. Every man in the team suffered wounds, although none was life threatening, some were, in fact, serious. It was the end of the team as a fighting force.

Securing a piece of terrain out of fire of the enemy, Granberry radioed for help. And help was on the way in the form of Delta Company.

An already planned exchange of Bravo for Delta on Ripcord was taking place even as Granberry's men became embroiled with the enemy. Williams was to become the new battalion operations officer, replacing Lucas' stalwart Maj. Herb Koenigsbauer, and Capt. Ben Peters would take command of Bravo.

Now, Rollison and his men moved toward the sound of guns, and the members of 1st Lt. Jim McCall's platoon led the way. By the time they got to the scout's position, it was approaching dusk, but McCall pushed on anyway, to provide security and to see if, maybe, he could get the drop on the enemy.

"I got close enough for a fight," McCall later said, "if I'd wanted one. But with dark approaching I decided against it."

But if there was to be no fight with the enemy on Hill 1000 the night of July 6, there was certain to be a vicious contest the following day. Rollison had received his orders from Lucas: "Assault Hill 1000 at first light tomorrow."

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